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Abstract  
This article examined the issue of whether or not the currency exchange rate, country 
risk, and cooperate tax rate affect decisions of multinational firms to invest in 
industrial clusters. First, if the exchange rate between a multinational company in an
industry of diminishing returns to scale and a developing country is appreciated, then 
production in the developing country should increase. Second, if the investment 
period becomes longer, the currency exchange rate of a multinational company’s 
country should be revalued more in order for it to further invest in the developing 
country. Third, if the investment period becomes longer, the developing country’s 
risk should become less. Fourth, compensation for the developing country’s high risk 
can be made by lowering its corporate tax rate.  
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1. Introduction   
 Central governments in Asian countries such as Japan and Thailand are 
implementing industrial cluster policies. An industrial cluster is a geographic 
concentration of manufacturing companies, suppliers, service providers, and related 
institutions in a particular field. In most cases, industrial cluster policies are 
implemented by local governments. However, industrial policies (different from 
industrial cluster policies) are policies implemented by a central government to foster 
domestic industries through reallocation of resources. Industrial policy is a selective-
intervention policy made by central governments. Scholars advocating industrial polices 
decreased in number following the Asian currency crisis in 1997 (see Stiglitz and Yusuf, 
2001). Nevertheless, the determination of the role of central governments in the 
implementation of industrial cluster policies used to activate local regions still warrants 
analysis.  
Many industrial clusters in industrial and export processing zones have been 
formed in Asia. The export-processing zone in Kaohsiung, Taiwan in 1965 was the 
original model for this. Industrial clusters in East Asia in the first half of the 1980’s 
followed those of special economic zones in Shenzhen, China and free trade zones in 
Penang and Johor, both in Malaysia. The issue for central and local governments is 
whether or not their policies are effective in forming industrial clusters. 
 The industrialization of East Asia in the latter half of the 1980’s appeared to be a 
game involving recipient countries such as Malaysia and Thailand on the one hand, and 
multinational corporations of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan on the other. The policies 
of these countries were centered on deregulation in order to attract foreign investment. 
This permitted 100% ownership of capital by foreign investors, not only in a few 
specific sectors, but also over a wide range of export-oriented industries. Further, the 
governments of these countries gave preferential treatment to foreign capital. This 
involved tax incentives such as low corporate tax rates and tax holidays (exemptions) 
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for a certain period. Such preferential treatment also provided industrial parks with 
infrastructures to entice foreign investment. 
 Incentives for multinational companies to establish their subsidiaries in other 
countries include abilities to transfer management resources (Penrose, 1956) and to 
reduce transaction costs (Hymer, 1960). In the case of East Asia in the 1980’s, however, 
cost reduction was the primary objective. Evidence provided in this article supports this 
as the primary motivation behind the increasing number of South Korean, Taiwanese, 
and Japanese companies that expanded overseas production during the latter half of the 
1980’s. As domestic costs rose due to the increase in wage rates and the appreciation of 
the domestic currency rates, Asian companies reduced costs by expanding overseas 
production. As shown in Figure 1, Kuchiki (2005) proposed a flowchart approach and 
theoretically showed that industrial cluster policy is effective in forming industrial 
clusters by establishing export-processing zones, enlarging building capacity, and by 
inviting anchor firms. Capacity includes infrastructure, institutions, human resources, 
and living conditions. The flowchart approach emphasizes the importance of both the 
ordering and timing of policy measures. Kuchiki (2003, 2004) illustrated the successful 
cases of Canon in Hanoi, Vietnam, and Toyota in Tianjin, China. Canon and Toyota are 
both Japanese companies; they functioned as anchor companies in the flowchart 
approach. However, whether or not policies of inviting foreign direct investment to 
export processing zones by central governments are effective in forming industrial 
clusters has not been shown. 
 This article examined the issue of whether or not governmental exchange rate 
policies, preferential tax policies, and country risk management policies are effective in 
inviting foreign investors to industrial clusters. Both static and dynamic models were 
used to analyze the effectiveness of each of these policies. 
 A static model concludes that if the exchange rate between a multinational 
company in an industry of diminishing returns to scale and a developing country is 
appreciated, then production in the developing country should increase. A dynamic 
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model also shows that if the investment period becomes longer, the currency exchange 
rate of a multinational company’s country should be appreciated more in order for it to 
further invest in the developing country. The dynamic model concludes that if the 
investment period becomes longer, the country risk of the developing country should 
become less. However, it can be shown that compensation for the developing country’s 
high country risk can be made by lowering its corporate tax rate. A more realistic model 
of countries in East Asia in the 1980’s supports this conclusion. Preferential treatment 
through tax reductions or exemptions given by developing countries appeared to be 
effective in inviting foreign direct investment. The models developed in this article 
imply that roles of central governments are crucial for inviting foreign direct investment 
that can be used to form industrial clusters by increasing the building capacity for 
infrastructures and institutions. This article focuses specifically on institutions of 
capacity building as seen in Table 1.  
 Section 2 of this article includes a demonstration of how deregulation and 
preferential tax treatment, which were selected to encourage foreign investment, played 
major roles in enhancing the economic growth in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, in the Chinese 
province of Guandong, and in areas of Malaysia and Thailand. Section 3 includes a 
decision-making model for multinational companies that intend to invest overseas. This 
model indicates that multinational companies will not become interested in foreign 
direct investment unless the overseas costs decrease to a certain threshold, and this 
depends on the tax rates of recipient countries. Preferential tax treatment is thus a 
crucial factor for multinational companies in making decisions regarding investment in 
other countries. Section 4 is devoted to conclusions. 
 
2. Export Processing Zones 
 Export processing zones represent one mechanism for rapid economic growth in 
East Asia. The prototype version for Kaohsiung, Taiwan was modeled on those in 
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Malaysia and Guangdong province in China. It was applied in Thailand and other Asian 
countries. 
 This model can also be applied to East Asian countries that have established 
conditions of political and macroeconomic stability and public security and who wish to 
invite foreign investment. The main policies for encouraging foreign investment 
include: (1) providing production sites by the quasi-public sector, that is, industrial 
parks with a well-developed “infrastructure”. This has been a common way of 
encouraging foreign investment. (2) The government selects leading industries to give 
preferential treatment for foreign capital. This usually involves “tax incentives” such as 
low tax rates and tax holidays (exemptions) for several years after the first profit has 
been generated. (3) At the same time, the government deregulates to allow up to 100% 
ownership by foreign investors. Permission reduces the investors’ risk since they need 
not find their partners. It should be noted that a high export ratio has been the only 
required condition for incentives such as 100% ownership of capital and preferential tax 
rates. 
 The export processing zones with these features, however, have not been enough 
to attract foreign direct investment. The mechanism has no effect unless companies 
(usually multinational companies) become interested in increasing overseas production. 
To achieve this, foreign companies must have incentives to invest outside their own 
countries. The most important incentive is to reduce cost, and this is determined 
primarily by three factors: wages, exchange rates, and taxes. Smaller costs seem to have 
had a decisive impact on the decision to allow overseas investment by Taiwanese, South 
Korean and Japanese companies from 1985 to 1990. This can be seen in the regression 
analyses presented in Appendix 1. 
 
3. Theoretical Analyses on Multinational Companies 
 This section theoretically demonstrates that under certain conditions, the 
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governmental policy of recipient countries is effective in inviting multinational 
companies. Three policies may be viewed in more detail: (1) currency devaluation, (2) 
permission given to multinational companies with totally foreign owned capital, and (3) 
preferential tax treatment. Proposition 1 indicates that it is easier for multinational 
companies to decide to invest in a country if its government has a devaluation policy. 
Propositions 2, 3, and 4 make it clear that multinational companies look more favorably 
on investment if the governments of recipient countries reduce country risk by 
permitting totally foreign capital. Proposition 5 shows that preferential tax treatment by 
recipient countries will reduce the country risk for multinational companies.   
 These policies were implemented in ASEAN countries from 1981 to 1994. They 
contributed to high economic growth during that period. 
 
(1) Necessary conditions for overseas investment 
 The variable θ  denotes country risk, that is, the level of political and 
macroeconomic stability in the recipient country. θ  affects the level of production in 
the recipient country F k( , )l , where k  is capital and l  labor. t  represents the 
corporate tax rate and e  the exchange rate of the investing country with respect to the 
recipient country (in units of the recipient country's currency). P represents the price 
of a product in the investor’s currency, r  the interest rate, and w the wage levels, all 
evaluated in the currency of the recipient country. The level of profit from overseas 
production, π f , can be expressed as follows: 
     π f  = max (1-t){P θ F(k’,l’)-rk’-ewl’} 
               k’,l’ 
             = (1-t){P θ F(k,l)-rk-ewl}, 
              where k’=k, l’=l. 
 This can now be contrasted with domestic production, using exactly the same 
production function. The new variables in an investor’s country are θd  (country risk), 
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td  (corporate tax rates) and wd  (wage levels). Without loss of generality, it can be 
assumed that the country risk of the investor’s country is 1. The profit π d  obtained 
from domestic production is then 
    π d = max (1-td){P θ F(k’d,l’d)-rkd’-ewld’} 
               k’d,ld’ 
             = (1-td){P θ F(kd,ld)-rkd-wdld}, 
where k’d=kd, l’d=ld. Here the interest rate r is the same as that in overseas production 
π f. 
 Assume here that the Cobb-Douglas production function for profit from overseas 
π f  is 
    F(k, l) = kalb (Without loss of generality, a constant=1 can be assumed.) 
 Fluctuations in the exchange rate e  then affect k and l as expressed in the 
following formulae: 
 
0)1/()/(/
0)1/()1()/(/
<−−⋅−=
<−−−⋅−=
babekek
baaee
∂∂
∂∂ ll
 
where diminishing returns to scale in the form a + b < 1 prevail. This represents an 
increase in overseas labor input and capital input as the currency of the investor’s 
country appreciates. The reverse can apply for increasing returns to scale.  
 Contrasting profits earned at home π d  with profits earned overseas π f , results 
in 
π πd f/  = { (1-td)/(1-t)}[(1/ θ )(ew/wd)b]1/(1-a-b)  
A multinational company may invest overseas if π d/π f < 1 ,  i.e. π d < π f 
 Relative profit π πd f/  with respect to the location of production is governed by 
the following factors: 
 Country risk, corporate tax rates, overseas wage levels, and exchange rate 
( , , , )θ t w e . 
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 It should be remembered that these four factors act as a group in determining the 
final outcome. The level of wages in the recipient w is multiplied by the exchange rate 
e  to obtain the level of wages paid out by the investing company. Since the following 
exchange rate analysis is equally valid for all wage levels w, relatively low wage levels 
do not constitute the only factor influencing relative profit.  
Country risk ( θ ) and corporate tax rates ( )t  will be explained briefly. 
 Country risk θ is governed by:  
  (1)  Political stability and 
  (2)  Macroeconomic stability.  
 The concept of political stability requires no explanation. Macroeconomic 
stability refers to consumer prices and the international balance of payments. Both 
forms of stability are considered pre-conditions for rapid economic growth. 
 With respect to corporate tax ( )t , preferential tax treatment via incentives such as 
tax holidays (zero taxation for a period of several years, i.e., t = 0) provides a major 
incentive for overseas production. The relative profit π πd f/  is less than 1 if (1/ θ ) 
(ew / wd)b ≤0.  
The introduction of preferential tax treatment by one East Asian country immediately 
puts others at a disadvantage. Later developers in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Vietnam, have thus been obliged to follow suit. 
  
(2) Dynamic analysis 
 A dynamic analysis can be more realistic than those previously explained; it 
shows the importance of the role of the government. The model examines a 
multinational company operating over two periods. In each period, π f  represents the 
level of potential profit from an overseas operation when the company does not set up 
overseas facilities. This is dependent on the exchange rate e  which is stochastic, has 
distributions G , and is identical and independent from one another. 
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 A company searches for countries and regions suitable for expansion. The 
potential profit earned from overseas operations is given by  
 π θf t P F rk ew= − − −( ) ( )1 l  
where country risk θ and exchange rate e  are considered random variables.  
 What is the threshold exchange rate e , representing the point at which a "yes" 
decision to invest abroad is taken? Country risk θ also has a threshold value. Normally, 
a “yes” decision requires both e  and θ to be above their respective threshold values; 
one without the other is not sufficient. This allows a two-stage analysis as follows: 
 The first stage includes a dynamic analysis of e  with θ constant at θ =1. This 
is used to assess the likelihood of a “yes” decision.  
 The second stage includes a dynamic analysis of θ as a random variable with 
given e  in the event that the offer is accepted.  
 In the basic model for the first stage, the periods are T −1 and T . First, period 
T  is considered and then period T −1. If the value function in period T  is V et ( ) , and 
the state variable is exchange rate e , then decision-making behavior can be expressed 
thus:  
 )(eVT  = max {π f , π d } 
The company invests abroad in the case of df ππ ≥ , that is,  
 ( ) ( ( , ) )1− − − ≥t PF k rk ew dl l π . 
Therefore, the value of the exchange rate should be  
 1
1w
PF k rk
t
edl l( ( , ) )− − − ≥
π . 
Or, eT ≥e, where )1(
1
t
rkPF
w
d
Te −−−=
π
l
, in order that df ππ ≥ . 
 This is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 In period T −1, the value function is given by V e sT−1 ( , ) , The state variables s  
indicate either D  (domestic production) or S (overseas production). The Bellman 
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formula (see Sargent, 1987) in this case is  
 { }),'(,)1(),(1 DeEVxmaDeV TdtT βππβ ++=− , 
where β  denotes a firm's discount factor. 
 The optimal solution may be found from two possible courses of action: (1) 
launching overseas production during the current period (T-1) at the given exchange 
rate e  and increasing overseas production in the next period (T), or (2) carrying on 
with domestic production during the current period (T-1) and postponing the decision 
until the next period (T). The value function V e DT−1 ( , )  in this case is  
 V e D
EV e DT
f
d T
− =
+
+
⎡
⎣⎢1
1
( , )
( )
( ', )
β π
π β
             
  
e
e
T
T
e
e
1
1
−
−
≥
≤
 
 where eT 1−  represents the decision threshold at the current period T-1. This 
satisfies the following expression: 
 ( ) ( ' , )1+ = +β π π βf d TEV e D .   
Since 
 )'()'(),'(
0
edGedGDeEV
eo
d
eo
fT ∫∫ ∞+= ππ , 
the threshold value eT 1−  during period T −1 is given by 
 ∫+−−−−=−
0
0
1
')'(
1
)
1
),((1
e
d
T deeGt
rkkPF
we β
βπll .  
Comparing threshold eT  in period T  with threshold eT 1−  in period T −1, 
 ∫ <+−=−−
0
0
1
,0')'(
1
e
TT deeGee β
β  
Thus 
 ee TT <−1 .． 
The critical value of the exchange rate of overseas investment in period T (eT ) should 
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be appreciated more than that of investment in period T-1 (eT 1− ). That is, the threshold 
value in any current period T-1 is smaller than that in the next period T. A multinational 
company will invest abroad in the current period unless its currency is appreciated more 
than the rate in the next period when it makes decision on the investment. This means 
that it will decide to invest abroad for two periods T-1 and T if its currency is relatively 
appreciated. We can continue to iterate this process as follows. 
ee TT 12 −− < ． 
The condition of the critical values for three periods is  
ee TT 12 −− < eT< . 
Taking Japanese investment as an example and using the above expression, the 
following proposition may be argued from a dynamic point of view: 
 
 Proposition 1: The longer the investment period of a multinational company, the 
more its currency must be appreciated.  
 
 In the same way, a “yes” decision is possible even under a relatively weak yen if 
the investment can be recouped in a short term. This explains why relatively short-term 
Hong Kong investments are more likely to be directed towards China than are Japanese 
investments. 
 The mean-preserving spread (Sargent, 1987) may be used to examine overseas 
expansion with respect to risk of exchange rate. G1 and G2  represent distribution 
functions for the exchange rate e  in the periods T-1 and T, and this varies within a 
limited range, from zero to B. 
 Assuming a mean-preserving spread, 
 ,')'()(
0
2
0
1 deeGdeeG
yy
∫∫ ≤  .0 By ≤≤             
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With eiT 1−  as the threshold value corresponding to Gi  
 ,')'(
1
)
1
),((1
0
0
1
deeG
t
rkkPF
w
e
i
di
Te ∫+−−−−=− ββπll   
where i is equal to 1 and 2. 
Therefore, 
 )')'(')'((
)1(
00
0
2
0
1
2
1
1
1
deeGdeeG
w
ee
TT ee ∫∫ −+−=− −− ββl  
and 
 ee TT 2 11 1 −− < .． 
From this, the following proposition may be derived:  
  
Proposition 2: The higher the risk of the exchange rate the stronger the currency 
of the investor’s country must be in order to generate a “yes” decision. 
  
In the basic model for the second stage, country risk θ  with the exchange rate 
fixed at e=1 may be considered. As before, two periods, T −1 and T , are used. The 
value function in period T  is given as VT ( )θ . 
 { }dfT xmaV ππθ ,)( = , 
where θ is a state variable with distribution function H. 
 When overseas production is more profitable than domestic production, π πf d≥ ,  
 ( ) ( )1 2 2 2− − − ≥t PF rk ew dθ πl . 
 The decision will be “yes”, and the threshold is then 
 { })1/()/1( 222 twrkPF dT −++= πθ l . 
 If country risk exceeds this value, the decision will be “yes”; otherwise the 
company will choose to remain at home. This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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 The value function for period T −1  is V sT−1 ( , )θ , where s D=  (domestic 
production) or S (overseas production). The Bellman formula in this case is  
 { }V D max EV DT f d T− = + +1 1( , ) ( ) , ( ' , )θ β π π β θ . 
The value function in this case is  
 ⎢⎣
⎡
+
+=− ),,' (
             ,)1(
),(1 DEV
DV
Td
f
T θβπ
πβθ    
1
1
−
−
≤
≥
T
T
θθ
θθ , 
 where 1−Tθ  represents the decision threshold. This satisfies the following 
expression: 
 ( ) ( ' , )1+ = +β π π β θf d TV D . 
 Country risk θ  is greater than 1−Tθ . Thus, if country risk is higher than that of 
domestic production, the decision will be “yes”. If it is lower, the company will choose 
to stay at home, postponing a decision until period T . 
 Comparing threshold Tθ  in period T  with threshold 1−Tθ  in period T −1, 
 ,0)'(
11
≥−+=− ∫
∞
− dHTT
θ
θθβ
βθθ  
where H is a distribution function for θ’. 
Thus 
 TT θθ >−1 . 
The following argument can be made: 
－－－－－－－ ＞ >−3Tθ >−2Tθ  TT θθ >−1  . 
  
Proposition 3: The longer the investment period, the higher the country risk level 
required to generate a yes decision. 
        
The issue of preferential tax treatment may now be examined. 
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Proposition 4: Preferential tax treatment, i.e., lower rates of corporate tax t2, 
generates a “yes” decision in the face of high country risk 
1−Tθ at period T-1. 
  
This can be demonstrated quite readily as follows: 
 { } )()'()1/()
1
(1
2
221 θθθββπθ
θ
dH
t
wrk
PF
d
T ∫
∞
− −++−++= l . 
And 
 0
)1( 222
1 >−=
−
tPFt
dT π
∂
θ∂ . 
 A company faces two thresholds in its decision to expand overseas, and both must 
be satisfied to generate a “yes” decision. One is the cost threshold that includes the 
appreciated exchange rate and the increased wage level of the investing countries. The 
other is country risk, and this is determined by political stability, public security, and 
macroeconomic stability. Preferential tax treatment, provided by developing countries, 
makes a critical contribution to passing the two thresholds. 
 
(3) East Asian Model 
  A general model may be developed with respect to three considerations. 
 The first consideration involves the preliminary survey costs associated with 
overseas investment; this is denoted as C. Costs are burdened by profits in domestic or 
overseas production. Information has to be obtained from abroad, and investing firms at 
one time dispatched study missions abroad. These costs have been very high for 
Japanese companies that tend to take longer times in decisions concerning overseas 
production.  
 The second consideration is the possibility that changes in the candidate country 
may render the planned expansion unfeasible if overseas production has been postponed 
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until the following period. An example of this is the bottleneck that was caused by rapid 
economic growth in Thailand and Malaysia in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. As 
inadequacies in the infrastructure of Thailand and labor shortages in Malaysia became 
evident, companies were forced to abandon earlier plans for expansion. The probability 
of such circumstances arising is denoted as x. Here it can be assumed that the 
probability (x) to abandon a plan for overseas production becomes lower as survey costs 
(C) are increased; that is, ∂x/∂C < 0. 
 In the last consideration, there is the possibility that a company with overseas 
operations may be forced to revert to domestic production (or move to a different 
country) when operations become untenable. This was witnessed in Singapore, Taiwan, 
South Korea, and other Asian NIEs. For example, a number of foreign companies were 
attracted to the Julon Industrial Park in Singapore in the late 1970’s. They were 
subsequently obliged to pull out of labor-intensive industries and were unable to 
maintain production under the three-year wage doubling policy brought in during the 
early 1980’s. The probability of such an outcome is denoted as δ . 
 The three variables in the model are thus: preliminary survey costs C ; the 
probability x of overseas production being rendered unfeasible sometime between the 
current period and the next; and the probability δ  of overseas operations established 
during the current period becoming untenable in the next.  
 The value function for period T  is  
 V C sT
c( , , , ) ,θ θ  
 where θ  represents country risk in the country under consideration (the 
reciprocal of country risk), θ C  the country risk in a second candidate country, C  the 
preliminary survey costs, and s  (which may be either domestic production D  or 
overseas production S).  
The Bellman equation in this case is:  
 VT(θc,θ,C,D) = max {πf – C, πd –C}. 
  15
As before, 
 )
1
(1 rkw
tPF
d
T ++−= l
πθ . 
 Note that profits from production in the second candidate country at productivity 
θ c  are assumed to be below profits π f  from the primary country under consideration.  
 In period T −1: 
       VT-1(θc,θ,C,D) = max {A, B}. 
Here,     
     A C EV C D EV C Ff T
c
T
c= − + + −π β δ θ θ δ θ θ[ ( ' , , , ) ( ) ( ' , , , )] ,' '1  
     )],,,'())(1(),,,()([ '' DCEVcxDCEVcxCB cT
c
Td θθθθβπ −++−= , 
  0/ <Cx ∂∂  . 
 During period T −1, production is carried out at home, and prior survey costs C  
are incurred. Therefore, B Cd= −π . With x as the probability that overseas production 
in period T  becomes underside, the total expected value B  for period T  is obtained 
by summing expected values xEVT(θ,θc’,C,D) and (1-x)EVT(θ’,θc’,C,D), and by 
discounting the total at a factor of β. 
 Due to overseas production and prior survey costs C  during period T −1, the 
value of A is π f C− . With δ  as the probability that overall operations become 
untenable during period T , at the point when overseas expansion is considered for the 
second time, the expected value is  
 δ θ θEV C DT c( ' , , , )' . 
 The expected value when overseas production continues and expansion into a 
second country is also being considered is 
 ( ) ( , , , )'1− δ θ θEV C FT c , 
where A is the total sum of the above three expressions. Thus: 
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 ⎢⎣
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A
DCV θθ
θθθθ . 
The threshold value at this time is  
 )(
)1(
)1()
1
(11
cd
T ZZtPF
xrkw
tPF
−−
−−+++−=−
δβπθ l , 
where  
 ,)'()'(),()1(
0
θθθ
θ
dHkPFtZ T∫∞ −−= l  
 )'()'(),()1(
0
222 θθθ
θ
cc
T
c dHkPFtZ
C
∫∞ −−= l . 
 Since Z c ≥ 0 and Z ≥ 0 at all times, the above may be rewritten as follows:  
 0
),(
))(1()( 1 ≥−−=−− lkPF
ZCx
t
c
TT δβ
∂
θθ∂ . 
 Therefore, reduced corporate tax rates provide incentive for multinational 
companies to set up overseas operations. Preferential treatment is also effective if the 
following condition holds: 
 0)(1 >−− δCx . 
 It was shown earlier that when x(C) becomes smaller, there is a greater chance to 
satisfy necessary conditions. This is the case where overseas expansion is being 
investigated during the current period with a view toward implementation in the next 
period under the same set of conditions. At the same time, efforts must be made to boost 
survey costs ( )C  in order to reduce x(C). It is reasonable to conclude that whether or 
not preferential tax treatment is effective in inviting foreign direct investment depends 
on value x (C). Preferential tax treatment is effective under a condition of smaller 
values of x (C). 
 The case where a second candidate country introduces preferential tax treatment 
in competition with the first may now be considered. This was witnessed in East Asia 
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during the 1990’s when countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines deregulated in 
competition with one another. In this case,  
 
t
Zx
t
T
−
−−=−
1
)1(
2
1 δβ
∂
θ∂ .  
 Thus, the introduction of preferential treatment by a second country facilitates 
overseas expansion. As an example, a multinational company considering operations in 
Vietnam benefits when Indonesia and the Philippines introduce preferential tax 
measures. An insufficient infrastructure and legal system ( )θ  in Vietnam would still 
not make expansion unviable. In this way, foreign capital is dispersed evenly 
throughout East Asia. Deregulation and preferential treatment in other regions (namely 
Southeast Asia) can therefore serve to facilitate the inflow of foreign capital, and this 
leads to the following proposition:  
 
 Proposition 5: Whether or not foreign direct investment by a multinational 
company in a candidate country will be more unlikely depends on value x (C), when 
preferential tax treatment is introduced in other countries. The more unlikely a 
multinational company is to invest in the country, the higher the probability of overseas 
production being rendered unfeasible sometime between the current period and the next. 
 
This article focused especially on capacity building with respect to a flowchart 
approach to industrial cluster policy. Among several factors of capacity building, the 
effectiveness of policies on institutions (such as tax incentives in forming an industrial 
cluster) was examined.  
 Kuchiki and Tsuji (2005) show that the implementation of governmental policies 
has a positive effect on inviting foreign capital and forming industrial clusters in Hanoi, 
Vietnam and Guadalajara, Mexico. This may be seen in Table 2. Similarly, using “tax 
incentives for investment” has had a positive effect in China and Vietnam. Table 3 
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shows that in 17.4% of interviewed companies in China, and 14.1% of those in Vietnam, 
indicated that they used it as one reason to invest. In Vietnam, 20.0% of the interviewed 
companies admitted that having “stable political and social conditions” was one of the 
reasons to invest in that country. 
 
4. Conclusions      
 In the latter half of the 1980’s, developing countries in East Asia established 
export-processing zones with sufficient infrastructures to attract multinational 
companies to invest. They did this by carrying out deregulation geared towards foreign 
investment, authorizing export-oriented sectors as priority sectors, and by granting 
preferential tax treatment.  However, multinational companies, especially in 
countries such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, where domestic wages were rising 
due to their tight labor markets, were forced to invest in other countries to reduce their 
costs. Their investment was further increased by the appreciated exchange rates which 
made domestic wages higher. So that export-processing zones in developing countries 
in East Asia were effective in inviting multinational companies.   
 This article theoretically showed that policies of both devaluation of the currency 
exchange rate and preferential tax treatment were effective in inviting foreign direct 
investment to countries in East Asia in the 1980’s. The static model showed that a 
multinational company in an industry of diminishing returns to scale would increase 
production in a developing country if its exchange rates with the developing country 
were appreciated. The dynamic model also showed that the longer the multinational 
company’s investment period, the more the exchange rate had to be appreciated in order 
for that company to continue to invest in the developing country. The dynamic model 
made clear that the longer the investment period, the less the country risk of the 
developing country had to be. However, it was also seen that compensation could be 
made for high country risk by reducing the corporate tax rate of the developing country. 
A more realistic model of countries in East Asia in the latter half of the 1980’s 
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confirmed this conclusion. Preferential treatment through tax reductions or exemptions 
by developing countries was effective in inviting foreign direct investment. These 
models imply that the roles of central governments in building capacity are crucial for 
inviting foreign direct investment to form industrial clusters. These roles include 
depreciating exchange rates, lowering corporate tax rates, and stabilizing 
macroeconomic conditions. 
 
  20
 
Appendix 1. 
 This Appendix contains a discussion of the underlying motivation for direct 
investment as revealed in questionnaire surveys on direct foreign investment by 
Japanese companies. When wages in recipient countries were low, the major incentive 
for multinational companies was cheap labor. Over 70% of companies investing in 
Thailand (1985) and China (1990) mentioned low wages as the reason for investment. 
At the same time, the growth in domestic markets in Asian NIE’s and ASEAN countries 
prompted more companies (over 70% in 1993) to set up overseas operations in 
anticipation of rising demand levels in those countries.  
 It is clear, then, that direct investment by Japan was motivated by the cost factor 
in the 1980’s. The correlation between Japanese direct investment and wages may be 
examined. Wage levels and exchange rates are major considerations when comparing 
costs in terms of labor wages. Fluctuations in the exchange rate played a particularly 
important role in the direct investment of South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan into other 
Asian countries during the latter half of the 1980’s.  
 Calculating a regression equation based on the correlation between wage level 
indices for South Korea, Taiwan and Japan (converted into dollars) and the approved 
value of foreign direct investment by each country over the period 1981-1991, the 
following was found:  
 
 Direct investment by South Korea = -5.56 + 3.61 (South Korean wages)  
                                 (-2.78) (9.11) 
  Adjusted    R D W2 0 89 1 87= − =. , .  
  
 
Direct investment by Taiwan = -21.8 + 6.59 (Taiwan wages)  
                         (-4.41) (6.74) 
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  Adjusted    R D W2 0 82 1 05= − =. , .  
 Direct investment by Japan = -5.09 + 2.98 (Japanese wages)  
                            (-3.00) (8.87) 
  Adjusted    R D W2 0 89 1 30= − =. , .  
Variables were converted into logarithmic form, and manufacturing wages in each 
country are given in dollar values with the 1980 level equal to 100.  
 There was a high correlation in all three cases, and t values indicated that all 
coefficients were statistically significant. Of particular interest is the similarity between 
wage elasticity in South Korea (3.61) and Japan (2.98). The value for Taiwan (6.59) is 
almost double that of those two countries. This indicates that reaction to cost is virtually 
twice as great as in Japan and South Korea.  
 The value of the South Korean, Taiwanese and Japanese currencies all rose 
against the dollar following the Plaza Accord in 1986, and wage levels also rose. This 
led to the threshold mentioned in section 3 and a sharp increase in the level of foreign 
direct investment from 1987 onwards.  
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Figure 2. Threshold of the Exchange Rate 
 
Source: The Author. 
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Table 1. Roles of Actors in the Flowchart Approach
Shortage 1 2 3 4 5
Industrial Zone
Infrastructure
Institutions XXX
Human Resources
Living Conditions
Anchor Company
Related Companies
1. Private Companies, 2. Multinational Corporations, 3. Foreign Assistance
4. Local Governments, 5. Central Government (The Flowchart Approach: Ordering and Timing Policies.)
Source:  The Author
ACTORS
Capacity
Table 2. Capacity Building and Industrial Cluster Characterized by Anchor Firms
Country JAPAN INDIA MEXICO CHINA CHINA VIETNAM Notes
City /Prefecture Okinawa Bangalore Guadalajara Shanghai Tianjin Hanoi
Type of Industry Call Center Software Electronic Automobile Automobile Printer
Capacity (a) Human Resources * JapaneseSpeaking HR
* College and
Graduate
Students
* Metal
Industry,
Components
* Existence
of Daihatsu Initial Condition
(b) Infrastructure
* National
Roads and
Ports
Rehabilitation
Positive Policy
Effectiveness of
the Central
Government
(c) Institution
* Support on
Communication
System
* Support by
the Chamber
of Commerce
Governmental
Support
* One-Stop
Service
Positive Policy
Effectiveness of
the Central
Government
* NAFTA * Tax System
(d) Living Condition Good Climate Good Climate Initial Condition
Anchor Firm GM, Ford Toyota Canon Automobile /Electronics
Conclusion: 1. Institutional support has a positive effect on industrial cluster formation.
3. There are cases where the initial condition is decisive. 
There are some cases where industrial cluster policy is not effective (not always). 
Source: Kuchiki, A. and M. Tsuji eds., Comparison of Industrial Agglomerations between Asia and the Other Regions , IDE-JETRO, 2005
2. There is no need to have anchor firms for industries other than that of the automobile industry, which
requires a great number of components.
Table 3.  Top Ten Promising  Countries for Overseas Business Operations and Why They are Promising
China Thailand U.S Vietnam India
(447 companies) (141 companies) (103 companies) (85 companies) (69 companies)
Potential for growth as a market 82.3% 51.1% 48.5% 41.2% 76.8%
Sales Present local market size 19.7% 17.0% 61.2% 5.9% 18.8%
Product development tailored to local needs 7.8% 6.4% 16.5% 1.2% 2.9%
Excellent human resources 24.2% 18.4% 24.3% 35.3% 30.4%
Inexpensive labor force 74.9% 57.4% 1.9% 74.1% 59.4%
Low-cost parts and raw materials 34.2% 11.3% 1.0% 12.9% 14.5%
Supply base for final assembly manufacturers 28.6% 34.0% 26.2% 14.1% 24.6%
Industrial concentration (concentration of sources, buyers, and partners) 14.3% 21.3% 19.4% 2.4% 2.9%
For risk diversification 4.5% 12.8% 4.9% 31.8% 4.3%
Base for exports to Japan 22.4% 19.9% 0.0% 24.7% 10.1%
Base for export to third world countries 21.9% 29.8% 3.9% 21.2% 17.4%
Local infrastructure (electric power, communications, transport, etc.) is well develop 9.4% 23.4% 35.9% 4.7% 2.9%
Tax incentives for investment 17.4% 24.8% 2.9% 14.1% 4.3%
Policies to attract foreign capital are stable 4.5% 14.9% 5.8% 7.1% 1.4%
Progress towards regional integration ( reduction of tariffs) 1.3% 9.2% 0.0% 2.4% 1.4%
Stable political and social conditions 4.0% 34.0% 37.9% 20.0% 1.4%
Indonesia Korea Taiwan Malaysia Russia
(62 companies) (42 companies) (33 companies) (30 companies) (25 companies)
Potential for growth as a market 56.5% 66.7% 30.3% 30.0% 92.0%
Sales Present local market size 17.7% 40.5% 57.6% 6.7% 16.0%
Product development tailored to local needs 3.2% 9.5% 6.1% 6.7% 0.0%
Excellent human resources 4.8% 21.4% 18.2% 16.7% 4.0%
Inexpensive labor force 67.7% 7.1% 3.0% 40.0% 8.0%
Low-cost parts and raw materials 12.9% 7.1% 6.1% 13.3% 4.0%
Supply base for final assembly manufacturers 27.4% 4.8% 15.2% 23.3% 4.0%
Industrial concentration (concentration of sources, buyers, and partners) 11.3% 19.0% 24.2% 3.3% 4.0%
For risk diversification 8.1% 7.1% 6.1% 23.3% 4.0%
Base for exports to Japan 14.5% 2.4% 3.0% 23.3% 0.0%
Base for export to third world countries 27.4% 9.5% 18.2% 13.3% 0.0%
Local infrastructure (electric power, communications, transport, etc.) is well develop 6.5% 35.7% 18.2% 26.7% 4.0%
Tax incentives for investment 6.5% 4.8% 6.1% 23.3% 0.0%
Policies to attract foreign capital are stable 3.2% 7.1% 3.0% 23.3% 0.0%
Progress towards regional integration ( reduction of tariffs) 9.7% 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 0.0%
Stable political and social conditions 0.0% 11.9% 18.2% 33.3% 0.0%
           (2) The table represents share with respect to the total respondent companies of each country.
Source: Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese Manufacturing Companies , JBIC Institute, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, 2004
Notes: (1) Figures in parentheses under each country name show the number of respondent companies. 
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